

# Method of sealed bids and of markers.

Week 3  
III 1/

Method where the asset cannot be divided (example: House, car).

For this method, you need cash and the asset is already divided.

Step 1  $P_1, \dots, P_N$   $s_1, \dots, s_m$  assets.

Each player bids for each asset  $s_1, \dots, s_m$ .

Step 2 We allocate each item for the highest bidder. (if reverse the lowest bidder).

Step 3 Compute the fair share value for each player

$$f_i = \frac{\text{Total value of his bids}}{\text{Number of players.}} \text{ for player } P_i.$$

Step 4 If what the player receives is more than his fair share, he gives money to the estate. Otherwise, he receives the difference.

Step 5 Compute the surplus.

surplus = amount of money received by estate

→ " " given  
 We divide the surplus among the players.

(We can do a reverse auction too).

Example (3.5 ex 43)

bidding list

	A	B	C
$s_1$	150	300	275
$s_2$	180	150	165
$s_3$	170	200	260
$s_4$	400	250	500
total	900	900	1200

B →  $s_1$

A →  $s_2$

C →  $s_3 + s_4$

fair value	300	300	400
value obtained	180	300	760
loss (from estate)	(120)	0	360

Surplus 240

↓  
 80 per player


A :  $s_2 + 120 + 80 = s_2 + 900 \$$

B :  $s_1 + 80 \$$

C :  $s_3 + s_4 + 80$

# Method of markers.

Idea put the different asset in line.




Step 1 Each player puts  $N-1$  markers between two consecutive assets

Step 2 sweep from left to right and look for the first marker

Anything on its left goes to the corresponding player.  
Remove that player's markers

Step 3 Look for any second marker after that  
the corresponding player gets the corresponding segment  
continue.

Step 4 Divide the surplus.



B1 : 1 2 3

C2 : 5 6 7

A : 10 11 12 13

Surplus : 4, 8, 9

# Lone chooser method and the method of sealed bids.

Week 3  
II  
1/


## Lone chooser method (3 person)

Idea: everyone is dividing.


Step 0 two dividers  $D_1, D_2$   
one chooser  $C$

Step 1  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  divide  $S$  (using the divider-chooser method)

$\rightarrow (s_1, s_2)$



Step 2  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  divide their share in 3 parts



Step 3 the chooser chooses 1 of the  $s_{1a}$   $s_{1b}$   $s_{1c}$   
and 1 of the  $s_{2a}$   $s_{2b}$   $s_{2c}$

Explanation  $D_1$  gets  $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{2}{3} = \frac{1}{3}$

Say ~~sets~~ for  $C$

$s_{1a}$	$s_{1b}$	$s_{1c}$	$s_{2a}$	$s_{2b}$	$s_{2c}$
$\alpha$	$\beta$	$\gamma$	$\alpha'$	$\beta'$	$\gamma'$

$$\alpha < \beta < \gamma$$

$$\alpha' < \beta' < \gamma'$$

C loses  $(\gamma + \gamma')$  (s<sub>1</sub>c and s<sub>2</sub>c), with value  $\gamma + \gamma'$

Is it more than  $1/3$  for him.

$$\alpha + \beta + \gamma + \alpha' + \beta' + \gamma' = 100\%$$

$$(\alpha + \alpha') + (\beta + \beta') + (\gamma + \gamma') = 100\%$$









$$(\alpha + \alpha') < (\beta + \beta') < (\gamma + \gamma')$$

$$3(\gamma + \gamma') \geq$$


$$(\gamma + \gamma') + (\gamma + \gamma') + (\gamma + \gamma') \geq (\gamma + \gamma') + (\alpha + \alpha') + (\beta + \beta') = 100\%$$


$\underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_{\geq (\alpha + \alpha')} \quad \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_{\geq (\beta + \beta')}$


Example





 6\$


 9\$

 90° → 6\$  
 $\frac{90}{6} \times 5 \rightarrow 5$$

s<sub>2a</sub>  75°

s<sub>2b</sub>  15° → 1\$

 40° → 4\$

 90° → 9\$

s<sub>2c</sub>  50° → 5\$

Now C prefers white part more than shaded.

C chooses s<sub>2a</sub> and s<sub>1a</sub>.

A values he received 6\$ + 6\$ = 12\$.

B values he received 10\$.

C values:  $\frac{5}{6} \times 12 + 12 + \frac{6}{9}$

 75°         10°

C values: 22,66\$